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ABSTRACT
The few existing studies on the response of labour to the economie crisis and
structural adjustment in African countries tend to focus on the (oppositionat)
relations between the state and central labour organizations. They largely
ignore the response of workers and unions at the workplace. This article
describes how workers and unions in the tea estates of Cameroon have dealt
with the economie crisis and structural adjustment. It shows that the workers
have adopted various strategies to cope with the structural adjustment
measures planned and implemented by the management in close co-operation
with the state-controlled unions. Two striking facts to emerge from the
analysis are that the majority of the estate workers have never completely
abandoned their 'traditional' militancy, and that gender differences in the
degree and modes of labour resistance tend to be slight.
J
For many years, the economy of Cameroon was viewed as one of the rare
success stories in Africa. This assessment was not without foundation:
Cameroon's economie performance was quite impressive, registering a
phenomenal growth rate of 6-7 per cent during the period 1970-86 (Jua,
1991). However, as Hugon (1968) was the first to point out, this optimistic
view tended to ignore certain weaknesses in the domestic economy which
constantly threatened the 'growth miracle', particularly the economy's
almost complete dependence on the export of agricultural raw materials
and—more recently—of oil.
This particular weakness became increasingly manifest from the mid-
1980s onwards, when the sharp fall in the prices of these commodities on the
world market, together with the 40 per cent depreciation of the US dollar
relative to the CFA franc, plunged the domestic economy into severe crisis.
The Situation was worsened by large-scale mismanagement, embezzlement
and capital flight estimated at FCFA 150bn. a year—a quarter of the
annual national budget. Apparently, the much-trumpeted slogans of 'rigour
and moralization' which Paul Biya coined on succeeding Ahmadou Ahidjo
as President in 1982 had been nothing but lip-service. After some hesitation,
the government was forced to adopt a Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP) in
1988/89, which contained such conventional prescriptions as important cuts
in public expenditures, increased state revenues, privatization, rehabilitation
or elimination of almost all the nation's parastatals, as well as thorough-
going liberalization (van der Walle, 1990).
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Surprisingly, while it is now widely accepted that wage workers are among
the most seriously affected by the economie crisis and SAPs in Africa, their
response has hardly been studied. The existing literature tends to focus upon
the actions of the central labour organizations in defence of their members'
interests. There seems to have been a large Variation in the role played by
these organizations in African states: it is said to have been 'spectacular' in
Zambia (Simutanyi, 1992), 'considerable' in Nigeria (Olukoshi and Aremu,
1988), 'unexpectedly low' in Ghana (Herbst, 1991), and 'absent' in
Cameroon (Mehler, 1993). Although there are references to the responses
of the workers themselves, these are seldom based on research at the local
level. This may give rise to easy generalizations and even to incomplete or
false interpretations of workers' responses, for numerous studies of
organized labour have highlighted the remarkable differences in workers'
consciousness and action between and within African states, and the contra-
dictions between the rank and file and the union leadership (see Jeffries, 1978;
Sandbrook and Cohen, 1975).
Nigeria is one of the few countries in Africa for which empirical studies on
local workers' responses to the economie crisis and SAP exist. These studies
seem to come to different conclusions. In a recent article, Oloyede (1992)
claims that shop floor workers in a local subsidiary of a Dutch electronics
multinational were more likely, on the basis of a rational calculation of
benefits and costs, to adopt an individual survival orientation than a
collective oppositional posture to managerial adjustment measures — the
benefit in this case being individual security or tenure and the cost, perhaps,
the further weakening of collectivism which the individual pursuit of
security may bring about. Some other case studies, however, do not support
Oloyede's claim: Bangura (1991) and Bangura and Beekman (1993), for
example, argue that Nigerian industrial workers have continued to oppose
managerial adjustment measures.
This article examines the response of plantation workers in Nigeria's
neighbour, Cameroon. The data are derived from intensive fieldwork in the
tea estates of the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), one of the
oldest and by far the largest agro-industrial parastatal in Cameroon (see
Konings, 1993). A study of the tea pluckers' responses to the crisis is all the
more interesting since the labour force on one of the two selected estates is
female-dominated. This enables us to explore the possibility of gender-
related differences in the pluckers' responses, taking into account the
frequent assumption in managerial circles that female workers tend to be
more docile and disciplined because of women's persistent Subordination to
patriarchal domination in society (cf. Elson and Pearson, 1984; Mies, 1986).
THE CDC AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
The CDC is a large agro-industrial parastatal located in the present South
West Province of anglophone Cameroon. It was founded in 1946/47, for the
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purpose of developing and managing the approximately 100,000 ha of estate
lands confiscated by the British Trusteeship Authority from the German
planters at the start of World War II (Konings, 1993). Between 1946/47 and
1985/86, it almost doubled its cultivated area, from about 20,000 ha to
40,000 ha, with the assistance of huge loans from several well-known
financial institutions, including the World Bank, the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA), the European Development Fund (FED), the
Commonwealth Development Corporation (COMDEV), and the (French)
Central Fund for Economie Cooperation (CCCE). It is still the second
largest employer of labour in the country, surpassed only by the government
itself. In the early 1950s it employed about 25,000 workers. At present, it
employs about 15,000 permanent workers and a few thousand seasonal and
casual workers. lts main crops are rubber, palm oil, bananas and tea. It
owns three tea estates and at present enjoys a monopoly on tea production
in the country.
In the years immediately preceding the economie crisis (1983/84-1985/86),
the corporation was still making substantial profits, totalling FCFA 3.2bn.
The crisis, however, had a dramatic impact on the financial Situation of the
corporation: during the period 1986/87-1990/91 it suffered a loss of about
FCFA 19 bn.1 There is no doubt that the sharp fall in commodity prices in
the world market was principally responsible for the virtual bankruptcy of
the corporation. Nevertheless, there were other factors which also
contributed to the emergence and continuation of the crisis. First, there
was the political élite's inability or unwillingness to control the Imports of
cheap tea and palm oil, which impeded CDC sales on the domestic market.
Second, there have been frequent reports of the managerial élite's
involvement in massive embezzlement, reckless expenditure, waste, and
struggles for power often based on ethnic considerations: small wonder that
many CDC workers did not believe that the management would be capable
of effectively combating the crisis.
The government used to subsidize parastatal enterprises annually,
irrespective of performance: by 1988, annual parastatal subsidies amounted
to about FCFA 150 bn. (van der Walle, 1990). Faced with a severe economie
crisis, the government could no longer render any financial assistance to the
CDC. To save the corporation from total collapse, the management and the
unions agreed to adopt a series of adjustment measures aimed at cost
reduction and productivity increase. This managerial strategy for economie
recovery was reinforced in 1989/90 when the IMF-inspired SAP demanded a
restructuring of the parastatal sector. The CDC was then obliged to sign a
four-year performance contract (1989/90-1993/94) with the government
(Tedga, 1990), under which the corporation was expected to achieve a set of
objectives in the area of plantation development, costs of production,
1. See CDC Annual Repons and Accounts, 1983-91; Yaoundé: SOPECAM.
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quantity and quality of output, and productivity of personnel. In return, the
government wrote off some of the corporation's debts and exempted it from
the payment of certain taxes. Soon after the signing of this contract, the
CDC General Manager announced a managerial crusade against
'undisciplined and unproductive' workers:
In the Contract Plan drawn up and signed by the Government of Cameroon and the
Corporation, the Corporation is required to meet certain Standards of efficiency and to be
self-supporting and profitable ... That is why we have to be generally very strict on discipline
and sanction any manifestation of laxity .. . Maximum efforts shall be required of employees
so as to continue producing more at lower and lower cost; laxity and laissez faire which are
characterized by an alarming rate of absenteeism and uncompleted tasks shall not be
tolerated.2
The various adjustment measures brought some relief to the company's
liquidity problems but, owing to the continuous decline in commodity
prices, the company's survival remained precarious. In June 1992, the Biya
government, which is highly dependent on French support, managed to
obtain a FCFA 7bn. low-interest loan from the CCCE for the ailing
Company. Although this loan provided much-needed capital for investment
purposes, the increased control of the French over the corporation was
strongly resented by CDC workers and the wider public in Anglophone
Cameroon. One of the clauses of the loan agreement with the CCCE obliged
the corporation to reorganize the tea sector, with a view to improving the
marketing of tea. By the end of 1992, it was made known that an agreement
had been signed between the CDC and COMDEV which transferred the
management of the three tea estates to COMDEV for a period of ten years.
COMDEV will run the tea sector as an autonomous enterprise and will pay
a royalty of FCFA 80 per kg of tea sold. Given that the corporation had
already entrusted the management of the banana sector to Del Monte in
1987, tea thus became the second major erop of the corporation to fall under
foreign management. As the CCCE seems to be interested in taking over the
management of the CDC oil palm sector, these developments seem likely to
lead to the eventual fragmentation and privatization of this sizeable
corporation which was once the pride of Anglophone Cameroon.
TRADE UNIONISM EN THE CDC AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
Trade unionism in the CDC has a long history. Immediately after the
foundation of the corporation in 1946/47, a trade union was established on
the CDC estates and duly registered. This union, the so-called Cameroon
2. Circular in file MEPS/SWP/BU.134/vol. IV, General Correspondence CDC. These
documents are located in the archives of the Provincial Delegation of Labour and Social
Welfare at Buea.
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Development Corporation Workers' Union (CDCWU), was soon to become
one of the largest and most powerful trade unions in West-Central Africa
(Warmington, 1960).
In contrast to the CDC management, the British Trusteeship Authority
was not opposed to the formation of this union, if only as a more
sophisticated means of labour control. As in other British colonies, the
Labour Department was quite successful in propagating within the newly
established union a specific trade union model which may be best described
as 'free, but responsible' trade unionism (Sandbrook, 1975). This trade
union model actively advised trade unionists to stay away from 'politics' and
to solve conflicts with employers in a cordial manner, through negotiation
and collective bargaining, rather than through strikes. The strike weapon
should be used only as a last resort, if all other means of settling disputes,
including conciliation and arbitration, had failed. I have tried to demon-
strate elsewhere that the introduction of this trade union model resulted in
the emergence of internal contradictions within the CDCWU (Konings,
1993). On the one hand, there were the union leaders who were mainly
recruited among the supervisory staff members and clerical workers. Being
relatively moderate in both their political and economie demands, they
tended to cling to the ideals of 'union autonomy' and 'union responsiblity'
which were impressed upon them by the Labour Department and inter-
national 'free' labour organizations. On the other hand, there was the vast
majority of unskilled and semi-skilled workers who, in view of manage-
ment's recalcitrant attitude, were less inclined than the union leaders to have
faith in the efficacy of the institutionalized procedures of joint negotiation
and collective bargaining, and were more committed to militant action.
These contradictions in the relationship between the rank and file and the
union leadership were never fully worked out during the period of the
CDCWU's existence (1947-72). This was mainly due to the fact that the
generally moderate trade union leadership was pressurized by the rank and
file into adopting a relatively aggressive bargaining policy with regard to the
management and the government, employing the strike option as a 'tactical
weapon' (see Paige, 1975): not only was strike action frequently threatened,
but it was also regularly employed, with workers called out on strike if all
'peaceful' means of settling conflicts had been exhausted. As a result, the
union leaders tended to enjoy massive support among the rank and file.
By the end of the 1960s, however, the post-colonial state was increasingly
beginning to intervene in the system of industrial relations and to curtail
union autonomy, with a view to curbing labour militancy and establishing
'total' control over civil society (Bayart, 1979). The 1967 Federal Labour
Code virtually outlawed strike action in the country, seriously weakening
the union's bargaining position. Despite strong resistance on the part of the
CDCWU leadership, trade unionism in the CDC became state-controlled in
1972. In a subsequent reorganization of trade unionism, the CDCWU was
dissolved and its members were required to join the newly created divisional
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unions of agricultural workers. This reorganization had a number of
disastrous consequences for trade unionism in the CDC. First, it became
subordinated to the single party. lts primary responsibility was to turn
workers into party 'militants' and to educate them in the need for increased
production and constant dialogue with the employers. There were high
expectations among the party leaders that the new trade union model was
going to accomplish what the Trusteeship model of autonomous trade
unionism had failed to achieve: the transformation of trade unionism into
an instrument of labour control and a 'responsible' partner in national
development. The second major consequence was the fragmentation of the
union, which created severe obstacles to united trade union actions. Since
the reorganization of trade unionism on a divisional basis, CDC workers
belong to five different unions of agricultural workers, membership
depending on the administrative division in which they are employed.
Since most CDC estates are located in the Fako Division of the South West
Province, the largest proportion of CDC workers belong to the Fako
Agricultural Workers' Union (FAWU).
Thirdly, the union became paralysed by lack of funds. Through the
introduction of a new system for the distribution of the check-ofF
contributions, the divisional unions were to receive not more than 50 per
cent of members' contributions. Moreover, a state-controlled National
Committee for Trade Union Contributions in Yaoundé was made
responsible for the collection and allocation of the check-off contributions
in the whole country, resulting — unsurprisingly — in frequent and often
prolonged delays in the remittance of monies to the divisional unions, and in
large-scale misappropriation of funds. This financial crisis prevented the
divisional unions from employing more than a few full-time officers and
from organizing any activities such as educational courses. Finally, the
union was stripped of any populär participation in the decision-making
process. Trade unionism became virtually a one-man affair, in the person of
the president of the divisional union: hè owed his position more to the
party's selection than to the workers' vote and could hardly be removed
from office as long as hè enjoyed the party's support. He tended to run the
union without any regulär consultation of the rank and file on policy
matters or allocation of funds; indeed, Executive Committee, Congress or
mass meetings became rare events. The union president also tried to control
the shop stewards who had been introduced in the Corporation in 1968.
Rather like party elections, union members were presented with a list of
'screened' candidates; all that the workers could do was approve the union
nominees, leaving them with virtually no say in who should represent them.
Out of protest, the workers sometimes refused to vote. Any shop steward
who caused 'trouble' to the management or opposed the 'one-man rule' over
the union ran the risk of being victimized by the president.
It was after the reorganization of trade unionism in 1972 that the
contradictions between the union leadership and the rank and file became
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increasingly obvious. Co-opted in the control structure over labour, the
union leadership rapidly lost populär support. Even more significantly, it
proved to be incapable of containing the rank and file's 'traditional'
militancy, as reflected in the large-scale participation of CDC workers in
several 'illegal' strike actions after 1972 (Konings, 1993).
Interestingly, following the introduction of a multi-party system in the
country in 1990, CDC workers began to pressurize the union leadership to
fight for a return to trade union autonomy. Most of the CDC workers hail
from the North West Province and are strong supporters of the Social
Democratie Front (SDF), the major Opposition party based in Bamenda,
the capital of the North West Province, which started the struggle against
the one-party state (Mehler, 1993). Mr C. P. N. Vewessee, once chairman of
the CDCWU and since 1974 president of the FAWU, also joined the
Opposition and soon became one of the most outspoken advocates of trade
union autonomy. In February 1991, hè declared:
The workers expect an independent and strong trade union organization that would be
autonomous in relation to all political parties and state bodies and institutions ... This will
relieve the trade union of the rubber stamp element in the country's political life. If the trade
union does not become more militant and resolute in its demands, it will not be of much help
to the workers. (Cameroon Post 20-27 February 1991, p. 11)
Vewessee also dared to condemn the corrupt leadership of the Confederal
Bureau of the Cameroon Trade Union Congress (CTUC) for its continuing
alliance with the ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratie
Movement (CPDM), and its complete neglect of the defence of the
workers' interests during the economie crisis and structural adjustment
Programme — a criticism that would have been impossible before the
introduction of multipartyism in 1991. His relentless efforts yielded some
success: on 2 April 1991, the CTUC leadership publicly announced that
union members were henceforth free to join any party of their choice
(Cameroon Tribune 9 April 1991, p. 5). However, during the executive
elections at the CTUC Congress in May 1992, which were clearly manipu-
lated by the ruling CPDM party, Vewessee failed to dissuade most delegates
from voting an alternative member of the CPDM's Central Committee,
Mr Etame Ndidi, into the office of president of the central labour
organization.3
Unfortunately, before the union leadership became involved in the
struggle for a return to trade union autonomy, it was already confronted
with the unprecedented economie crisis in the corporation. This crisis tended
to weaken further the bargaining position of the state-controlled unions vis-
d-vis the management. Their principal strategy became the protection of the
workers against retrenchment, even if this would demand some curtailments
in past gains.
3. See The Standard 29 June-15 July 1992, p. 3; and Cameroon Post 17-24 June 1992, p. 6.
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In 1987, the union presidents on the corporation's estates were
approached by the CDC management to assist in the planning and Imple-
mentation of adjustment measures. The management apparently assumed
that the assistance of the unions would be important in controlling the
anticipated resistance of the workers to a painful adjustment programme.
This assumption was questionable; such assistance on the part of the union
leaders was just as likely to enhance workers' dissatisfaction with the union
leadership and result in their refusal to co-operate. However, the union
presidents eventually agreed to assist the management in its struggle for
economie recovery.4 There were a number of factors behind this decision,
including the fact that, since the reorganization of trade unionism in 1972,
the unions had become used to solving problems with the management and
the state through peaceful negotiations rather than through confrontation.
In this particular case, the union presidents agreed with the management
that, given the corporation's inability to secure any loans or public subsidies
during the crisis, cost reduction and productivity increase were necessary
prerequisites for economie recovery. Furthermore, they were assured by the
management that nobody in the Corporation would be exempted from
making sacrifices for the sake of economie recovery. Finally, they hoped
that the implementation of an adjustment programme would safeguard the
jobs of the sizeable CDC labour force.
On 23 August 1987 the union presidents agreed with the management
upon a substantial increase in the productivity required of estate workers.
For example, the daily quota required from tea pluckers was raised from
26 kgs to 32 kgs of green leaves. The union leaders assured the management
that they would elicit the support of the workers for this measure.5 As the
corporation's financial position continued to deteriorate, the management
proposed further 'austerity' measures to the union presidents. After some
negotiations, a new agreement was signed on 6 January 1990, entailing
drastic cuts in the salaries and fringe benefits of all the workers and
managerial staff members, amounting to some 30-40 per cent of their
previous incomes. The Corporation used to supply the workers with free
housing, water, electricity and medical facilities; henceforth, they were
obliged to make substantial contributions towards the supply of these
services. The most draconian measure, however, was the introduction of a
compulsory savings scheme, forcing the workers to save at least 15 per cent
4. See letter from Mr C. P. N. Vewessee, President FAWU, to Provincial Delegate of
Labour and Social Insurance, Buea, dated 13 May 1992, in file MTPS/IDTPS/SWP/
LB.2/vol. XXVII, Complaints from CDC (Buea: archives of Provincial Delegation óf
Labour and Social Welfare).
5. See Report of the Divisional Inspector of Labour, Limbe, on Mass Meetings with the
Workers of the CDC Estates/Services in connection with the Economie Crisis, in file
MEPS/SWP/BU.134/vol. IV, CDC General Correspondence (Buea: archives of Provincial
Delegation of Labour and Social Welfare).
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of their basic wages and salaries for the corporation's recovery.6 It has been
estimated that the compulsory savings and fringe benefits contributed by the
workers during the period February 1990-February 1992 to talled about
FCFA2.9bn.7
Following the achievement of a degree of trade union autonomy in 1991,
the union presidents became somewhat more responsive to the sufferings of
the workers and began to criticize the adjustment programme they had
previously supported. On their urgent request, the CDC General Manager
organized an appraisal meeting of the January 1990 agreement. During this
meeting (on 14 March 1992), the FAWU president, Mr Vewessee, insisted
upon the termination or modification of the workers' financial contributions
to the corporation's economie recovery. He justified this remarkable change
in the unions' position as follows:8
• The unions had expected that the increased output and financial
sacrifices of the workers would have forestalled, or at least minimized,
any retrenchment. This had proved to be wishful thinking, and the
management had embarked upon mass lay-offs of workers. For
example, during the period 1986/87-1990/91 the labour force at the
Tole and Ndu Tea Estates had been reduced from 1546 to 974 and from
1750 to 1333 respectively.
• The unions had expected the government to take appropriate measures
to stabilize the prices of essential commodities and to standardize the
wages of the agro-industrial parastatals: this had not happened. Neither
had the National Social Insurance Fund continued to pay family
allowances to the workers. In fact, prices had sky-rocketed after the
political opposition's 'ghost town' campaign,9 wages had been frozen
since July 1985, and taxes had been increased by 100 per cent. As a
result, CDC workers 'would now seem to be carrying out forced labour
as a majority of the labour force has no take home wages at the end of
the month'.
• The unions had supported the 6 January 1990 agreement because the
CDC was at that time unable to obtain financial aid. This Situation,
6. See Agreement between the CDC General Manager and the Presidents of the Divisional
Agricultural Workers' Union from Fako, Meme, Moungo, Ndian, Menoua and Donga-
Mantung, dated 6 January 1990.
7. See Cameroon Post 19-26 February 1992, p. 6.
8. See Minutes of the Second Appraisal Meeting of the 6 January 1990 Agreement between
the CDC Management and the Workers' Unions which was held in the General Manager's
Office on 14 March 1992, in file MTPS/IDTPS/SWP/LB.2/vol. XXVII, Complaints from
CDC (Buea: archives of Provincial Delegation of Labour and Social Welfare).
9. This was a campaign of ei vil disobedience organized by the Opposition parties to force the
Biya-regime to call a national conference. It involved the stoppage of all work, all trade,
and all traffic in the towns, except for Friday evenings and Saturdays, resulting in huge
personal and public financial losses and an aggravation of the economie crisis.
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however, had recently changed, with the CCCE grant of a FCFA 7 bn.
loan to the Corporation. Consequently, the workers were no longer
willing to make any further sacrifices for the corporation's recovery.
• The unions would no longer tolerate the fact that the workers were
making sacrifices for economie recovery while the political and
managerial elite 'continued to loot the parastatals'.10
The management refused to withdraw the 6 January 1990 agreement. The
only concession it was willing to make was a 3 per cent reduction in the
compulsory savings rate, to partially compensate the workers for the tax
increases. This was unacceptable to the unions. As the management declined
to reconsider its offer, the FAWU president, Mr Vewessee, declared a
collective trade dispute on 13 May 1992. When the management tried to
employ delaying tactics, CDC workers in the Fako Division went on strike
(21 to 26 May 1992). After this strike, the management agreed upon various
amendments of the 6 January 1990 agreement, including the re-introduction
of free accommodation and water to the workers, and a 24 per cent
reduction in medical costs.11
Although there was a certain improvement in the relationship between the
union leadership and the management after these amendments, tensions and
conflicts have never completely disappeared. The union presidents complain
regularly about the management's lack of consultation with the unions,
while the management, in turn, constantly stresses that in a Situation of
crisis the unions should concentrate on an increase in labour productivity
rather than on the representation of workers' interests.
TEA PLUCKERS AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
In order to examine the CDC workers' response to the adjustment measures,
I carried out intensive research on two CDC tea estates during the period
1991-3 (see Konings, forthcoming). These estates were created during the
1950s, when the British Trusteeship Authority starled to actively promote
local tea production. The first, the Tole Tea Estate, was created in 1954 in
the Fako Division of the South West Province. It is the only CDC estate
which employs predominantly female pluckers, the majority of them
originating from the North West Province, the 'traditional' labour reserve
10. See also Labour Day speech by Mr C. P. N. Vewessee on l May 1991, in Messager(e)
13 May 1991, p. 4.
11. See Addendum to the Agreement of Sixth January 1990 between the CDC and its Workers
represented by the Presidents of Fako, Meme, Moungo, Ndian, Menoua and Donga-
Mantung Agricultural Workers' Unions, in file MTPS/IDTPS/SWP/LB.2/vol. XXVII,
Complaints from CDC (Buea: archives of Provincial Delegation of Labour and Social
Welfare).
for the coastal plantations (DeLancey, 1974). The second estate, the Ndu
Tea Estate, was created in 1957. It is located in the Donga-Mantung
Division of the North West Province. It was owned by a British-Indian
multinational, the Estates and Agency Company Ltd (EAC), which had
substantial tea interests in India and Sri Lanka, and was taken over by the
CDC in 1977. At present, it is the only CDC estate in the North West
Province and one of the few CDC estates without labour camps. It employs
almost exclusively local male labour.
The gender difference in the labour forces employed on these estates is by
no means accidental. It is the outcome of two potentially conflicting factors:
on the one hand, the capitalist preference for female pluckers and, on the
other, the patriarchal control over female labour in the local communities
(see Stichter and Parpart, 1988). There has long been a demand for female
labour on tea estates throughout the world. Tea estates, in fact, were among
the few capitalist enterprises during colonial rule that gave preference to
female over male labour. The rationale for this preference was the
managerial belief that women tended to be more productive than men in
certain tasks (they had 'nimble fingers' and were, therefore, naturally suited
to plucking tea), as well as being more docile and cheaper. This preferential
demand formed a direct threat to customary patriarchal control over female
labour. In 1952, just a few years before the creation of the two tea estates,
Kaberry published her classic study of women in the present North West
Province. Throughout the book she emphasizes the contradictory position
of women in society. On the one hand, there is the general recognition that
women play an indispensable role in society as child bearers and food
producers. On the other hand, they are subordinated to patriarchal controls
in society. These contradictions in the position of women, however, may not
be as puzzling as they first appear. Control over women's vital productive
and reproductive labour constituted the basis of men's prestige, power and
wealth in society. In a recent study of women in the North West Province,
Goheen (1993: 250) observes:
Women grew the food crops and were expected to provide the necessities of daily life from
their farms. Women's productive labour forced men to participate in (lucrative) trading
networks; their reproductive labour increased the size of the Household and thus the status
and the labour force of the male head. Any surplus value women produced over and above
that required for household needs and petty barter was in the hands of men, who retained all
the profits.
The managerial demand for female pluckers proved to be more successful
on the Tole Tea Estate than on the Ndu Tea Estate, largely because
capitalism had had a more disruptive effect on the social formations in the
South West Province than on those in the North West Province.
Consequently, patriarchal Opposition to female employment on the newly
established tea estates was less pronounced in the former than the latter
province. The introduction of plantation agriculture in the South West
l
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Province during German colonial rule had resulted in the large-scale
expropriation of land and a regulär flow of migrant labour, especially from
the North West Province, to the coastal estates. The CDC, which took over
most of the ex-German plantation lands, was not dependent on the goodwill
of the local chiefs for the supply of land and labour when the Tole Tea
Estate was created in 1954. Furthermore, chieftaincy was a relatively weak
institution in the segmentary societies of the South West Province and was
often a colonial creation. Despite the pervasive ideology of patriarchal
dominance in their communities, these chiefs were in no position to contest
the managerial decision to employ female labour, as they had no authority
on the CDC estates. Moreover, at the time of the establishment of the Tole
Tea Estate, female employment on the CDC estates was not a new
phenomenon. The CDC management used to encourage the wives of its
workers to seek employment on the estates.
By comparison with the South West Province, there was a low degree of
capitalist penetration in the North West Province. Determined to create a
tea estate at Ndu in 1956/57, the EAC management was heavily dependent
on the goodwill of the local chief and elders for the supply of land and
labour; chieftaincy continued to be a powerful institution in the centralized
states of the North West Province (Nkwi and Warnier, 1982), still capable of
resisting any serious capitalist onslaught on local value-systems and
authority patterns. During the negotiations, the chief of Ndu strongly
opposed the managers' proposal to employ female pluckers on the estate,
insisting instead on the employment of local male labour as a prerequisite
for the setting up of the estate in his area of jurisdiction — a condition that
would not only halt the migration of local male labour to the coastal areas,
but also forestall the construction of labour camps, common to the coastal
estates. In this way, he hoped to safeguard not only 'traditional' male
control over women's productive and reproductive labour, but also the
continuous integration of male workers into the local community and their
loyalty to the traditional code of ethics and authority patterns. In the end,
hè agreed that some women might be employed on the estate for specific
activities, notably weeding, on a casual or temporary basis, provided that
their employment on the estate would not affect their productive and
reproductive responsibilities in the local community. The EAC negotiation
team had no other choice but to comply with the conditions set by the local
chief.
From the start, the labour force on these estates showed some common
characteristics (see Table 1). First, the labour force tends to be either
illiterate or poorly educated. This is, of course, not surprising. For this
category of workers, plantation labour forms one of the rare employment
opportunities in the capitalist sector. Second, it consists mainly of men and
women who have tried to escape from the control of (male) elders in their
local communities and build up an autonomous existence. Table l
demonstrates that most women employed on the Tole Tea Estate tend to
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be 'husbandless' (cf. Bryceson, 1980). Some of them are young, single
women who often have no access to land, but instead are expected to work
as unpaid labour on the family farms. Most of them, however, are older
women who, by the dissolution of a marriage either through death or
divorce, have lost relatively secure usufruct rights in land. Rather than
becoming dependent on the family elders for their survival, they preferred to
migrate to the tea estate where they could be sure of a regulär monthly wage
income. Ndu workers, in contrast, tend to be local men who have failed to
become family heads and are, therefore, eager to escape from the control of
those who have succeeded. They perceive plantation labour as an avenue to
a relatively autonomous existence and, above all, to social mobility in the
local community. There is often a specific sequence in the attainment of such
social mobility objectives: first to build a house and to marry one or more
wives who will be responsible for the cultivation of food; then to set up a
coffee farm and to raise cattle; and eventually to invest in the acquisition of
some honorific titles which give access to the same power and wealth in the
local community that are available to hereditary office and title holders.
These are not easy objectives for the low-waged estate workers, and very few
manage to accomplish them all.
Thirdly, the labour force on these estates tends to be highly committed to
its job, becoming increasingly stable. Over 60 per cent of the Tole and Ndu
workers have been employed on the estate for more than ten years (see
Table 1). In general, both groups have a high stake in plantation labour.
Tole female workers tend to be not only husbandless, but also household
heads with children to support. They are often highly dependent on
plantation labour for the reproduction of their families, lacking the time and
energy to engage in any additional income-generating activities. Most
women have acquired a small food farm for subsistence and trading
purposes, but they actually experience great difficulties in combining food
production and trade with their daily work-load on the estate and in the
household. Ndu workers, too, tend to work for a long period on the estate,
eager to realize their social mobility goals. Although they tend to become
involved during their working career in a variety of potentially lucrative
economie activities, such as coffee production, cattle rearing and trade, they
usually retain their job on the estate. Plantation labour serves as an
insurance against any future misfortune in their expanding economie
activities and a source of further investments.
Despite these common characteristics, there are also some differences
between the Tole female workers and the Ndu male workers. One major
difference is the degree of contact with their home towns. Unlike the Ndu
male workers, who remain strongly integrated in their local community,
Tole female workers maintain very few close links with their region of
origin. The 'husbandless' women in particular seem to have largely severed
the ties with their home towns and villages. Their escape from patriarchal
control tends to prevent them from maintaining contact with their family
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Table J. Demographic characteristics of tea estate workers in Cameroon (%)
Tole women Ndu men
Age
15-25 years
25-35 years
35-45 years
45-55 years
55 years and above
Marital Status
single
married
widowed
divorced/separated
free union
Educational Level
illiterate
primary education
post-primary education
Religion
Christian
ancestral belief
muslim
7.5
32.5
41.0
17.0
2.0
100.0
9.0
32.0
27.0
25.0
7.0
100.0
78.0
20.5
1.5
100.0
94.0
6.0
3.5
25.0
38.5
28.0
5.0
100.0
8.0
90.5
1.0
0.5
100.0
56.5
39.5
4.0
100.0
92.0
7.0
1.0
Years of Service
0-5 years
5-10 years
10-15 years
15-25 years
25 years and above
100.0
17.0
19.5
39.0
19.5
5.0
100.0
100.0
12.5
24.5
17.5
31.5
14.0
100.0
Source: Computed from data supplied by the estate offices.
members and gaining access to land at home. Their 'exit-option' from wage
employment is usually a switch to petty trade in the urban centres rather
than a return home. Even married female workers on the Tole Tea Estate
seem to find it difïïcult to keep up intensive contact with their family
members at home. Geographical distance and a six-day working week
constitute serious obstacles to regulär communication. Many female workers
visit their home towns only during the annual leave period, or on special
occasions such as funerals of close kin.
There are also certain divisions within the labour force on the two estates,
mainly based on education, occupation, gender and marriage as well as
ethnic and regional origin. There is a division, for instance, between the vast
Plantation Labour and Economie Crisis in Cameroon 539
majority of illiterate and poorly educated field workers and the tiny group of
better educated clerical workers. The latter tend to look down upon the field
workers and to treat them rudely when they visit the estate offices. There is
also a division between male and female workers. The root of this cleft is the
pervasive ideology of male dominance. For example, male workers expect
the (male) management to give them preference over female workers when
there is an opportunity for further training or promotion, and to fire female
workers first when there is a retrenchment exercise. They are reluctant to
work under female supervision and regularly harass their female colleagues.
There is a persistent fear among the married men that wage employment will
make their wives too 'head-strong' or independent. There is also a division
between married and unmarried female workers. Unmarried women tend to
be relatively free from patriarchal controls, but they are accorded very little
respect, being labelled 'loose women' or 'prostitutes'. Married female
workers, on the other hand, are highly respected, but they are still constantly
subordinated to male dominance. Some husbands insist that according to
African tradition, women are responsible for the upkeep of the family; these
men tend to make very little financial contribution, spending their wages as
they choose. Others, especially men from the North West Province, even
claim that they are traditionally entitled to their wives' wage income.
Finally, there is a division on ethnic and regional lines. There is a greater
ethnic and regional heterogeneity among the Tole female workers than
among the Ndu male workers. On the Tole Tea Estate there is a clear North
West-South West divide: 67 per cent of the Tole female workers originale
from various ethnic groups in the North West Province and 29 per cent from
ethnic groups in the South West Province. On the Ndu Tea Estate, almost
all workers hail from two ethnic groups in the North West Province: 73 per
cent belong to the local ethnic group, the Wimbum, and 23 per cent hail
from the neighbouring ethnic group, the Nso, most of them living in villages
surrounding the estate. Although ethnic and regional heterogeneity is a
potential source of conflict, with rivalry being sparked by suspicions of
favouritism on hiring or promotion or on disagreements with supervisors or
co-workers, there has been very little incidence of serious, protracted ethnic
clashes on either estate. Interestingly, although the labour force at the Ndu
Tea Estate is ethnically less heterogeneous than that at the Tole Tea Estate,
it was nevertheless the scène of more overt ethnic tensions and conflicts
during the 1960s. This was due, in part, to Ndu chauvinism: since the estate
was located on Ndu land, the chief and people used to claim that Ndu
workers should be given priority when vacancies occurred for leading
positions on the estate.
Generally speaking, however, estate workers of different ethnic groups
and regions tend to live and work together peacefully. It has been the
consistent policy of the management, as well as church and union leaders, to
mobilize and organize workers on a multi-ethnic basis, and this policy seems
to have created a certain measure of understanding and tolerance among the
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workers for each other's socio-cultural background and to have fostered
bonds of companionship and friendship across ethnic boundaries. The
general use of Pidgin English has also helped to overcome barriers of
communication between the various ethnic groups. The most important
reason for this relative harmony, however, appears to be the sharing of
similar living and working conditions on the estates, which are classic
examples of occupational communities. The internal divisions which do
exist have never prevented the tea pluckers from regularly engaging in
common actions for the protection of their interests. The estate workers
display a rather ambivalent attitude towards plantation labour: on the one
hand, they appreciate it, for it provides them with a regulär source of
income; on the other hand, they have an acute feeling of exploitation and
Subordination in the labour process.
As in other parts of the world (cf. Loewenson, 1992), estate workers in
Cameroon receive a relatively low remuneration for their arduous work.
Unlike other parts of the world, however, (cf. Kurian, 1982) there is no
difference in the remuneration of male and female workers on the
Cameroonian estates. Before the economie recession, tea pluckers on the
CDC estates used to earn an average net monthly wage of approximately
FCFA 20,000-25,000. Quite a number of pluckers, however, were unable to
earn this amount, mainly due to the link between the remuneration of
workers and the system of task work prevailing on the plantations.
Completion of the daily task set by the management entitles a worker to the
daily basic wage; non-completion of the allotted task is punished by pro-rata
payment, the worker receiving a proportion of the wage equivalent to the
Proportion of the task completed. While workers' incomes have been
seriously reduced during the economie crisis, managerial controls over the
labour process have been intensified, so as to raise labour discipline and
productivity.
From the first days of estate tea production, the union leadership and the
Labour Department have consistently instructed the pluckers that the union
is supposed to be the normal intermediary channel between the workers and
the management. As a result, workers usually turned to the union in the first
instance for the representation and defence of their interests. Their support
for the union, however, was never unconditional. They expected their union
leaders to act promptly and energetically during individual and collective
disputes and to produce results. When such expectations were not realized,
workers began to by-pass the union and to employ alternative methods,
such as informal actions, pursued on an individual or small-scale basis, and
collective actions (see Cohen, 1980; Crisp, 1984). This was particularly true
of the period of state-controlled unionism. Loss of confidence in the union
seems to have been more clearly manifest at the Tole Tea Estate than at the
Ndu Tea Estate. The degree of participation in union affairs has always been
conspicuously lower among female pluckers than among their male
counterparts because of the patriarchal union structure and women's
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multiple productive and reproductive responsibilities outside the labour
process (cf. Parpart, 1988; Pittin, 1984).
Confronted with the (initially) close co-operation between the union
leadership and the management in the planning and implementation of
austere adjustment measures, the response of the tea pluckers was complex
and varied. Some workers opted for a single strategy, others for several
strategies, simultaneously or consecutively. A growing number of pluckers
have become survival-oriented in the climate of insecurity: they are inclined
to acquiesce in whatever economie recovery measures management may
introducé, however stringent, for the sake of keeping their job. They try to
impress the management with above-average output, and avoid conflicts
with their supervisors. This tendency seems to be somewhat more marked
among the Tole female pluckers than among the Ndu male pluckers, no
doubt attributable to the fact that the Ndu male pluckers are still strongly
integrated in the local community and usually enjoy an easier 'exit-option'
than the Tole female pluckers.
Some workers continue to rely on the unions for handling their individual
and collective grievances, but a growing number by-pass the unions and
lodge their complaints directly with the Labour Department. This
department is overburdened with work, often resulting in long delays in
settling disputes. What is even more striking, however, is the fact that the
majority of workers seem to have clung on to their informal and collective
resistance during the crisis. Since the foundation of the corporation in 1946/
47, such actions have usually been oriented at combating various managerial
efforts, such as attempts to increase labour productivity, notably through an
increase in task work; to strengthen control over the labour process; and to
minimize wages and other conditions of service. These management efforts,
which are obviously crucial to capital accumulation, were intensified during
the economie crisis and became central to the corporation's adjustment
measures. The workers' persistent resistance against these efforts is princi-
pally manifested in their informal actions, which is quite understandable:
collective actions are extremely risky in a Situation where strikes are
virtually outlawed and are likely to elicit severe managerial reprisals in the
form of summary dismissals. Such collective action is a last resort measure,
if other means of settling long-standing disputes have failed. Significantly,
however, the number and intensity of informal actions, which are difficult
to control by the management, seem to have increased somewhat during
the crisis, in response to the various adjustment measures of the manage-
ment.
Managerial Efforts to Maximize Labour Productivity during the Crisis
On 23 August 1987, the union presidents informed the pluckers at both
estates that they had agreed with the management upon an increase in the
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daily task from 26kgs to 32kgs of green leaves.12 Most pluckers strongly
resented this agreement; they told the union presidents that the new norm
was too high, as many of them already experienced difficulties in reaching
the old quota.
The Tole female pluckers continued to resist the implementation of the
new norm on the estate. Eventually, the CDC General Manager had to call
upon the FAWU president, Mr Vewessee, to make a renewed attempt to
persuade the women to accept the agreement. During a mass meeting
organized by the union on 23 October 1987, the women reluctantly agreed
to accept the new norm on condition that every worker in the corporation
would be obliged to contribute to economie recovery. The Ndu male pluckers
could not forestall the implementation of the new norm on the estate, but
they soon started to express their dissatisfaction in two ways. First, during
the executive elections of the Donga-Mantung Agricultural Workers'
Union (DUAW) in September 1987, they refused to re-elect their president,
Mr Johnson Tanto Massa, and instead voted a non-estate worker, Mr
G. N. Majam, into office. Secondly, they started a go-slow in November
1987, which resulted in all of them being paid pro-rata. It was only after they
had been given the opportunity to check upon the implementation of the
new norm on the other CDC tea estates that they were willing to call off the
action.
One year later, on 3 October 1988, the Tole female pluckers went on
strike. They alleged that they were unable to fulfil the new task requirement,
in spite of working from 6.30 am to 6pm each day. They added that they no
longer feit obliged to adhere to the agreement as their condition for
accepting the new norm—the contribution of all workers to the economie
recovery programme — had not yet been met by the management. The
union president, Mr Vewessee, strongly condemned the pluckers' strike
action, pointing out that it was illegal as they had not followed the
prescribed procedures for settling conflicts. He was booed and jeered by the
angry pluckers. The CDC General Manager then threatened the strikers
with dismissal if they did not report for work the next day, with the result
that most pluckers decided to resumé work. Seventy-nine continued to
strike, however: they were summarily dismissed by the management. Many
of them stayed in the area surviving on farming and trading.
No further collective actions on this issue have been reported. There is,
however, some evidence that the pluckers increasingly resort to informal
actions to protest against managerial efforts to raise labour productivity.
Unexpectedly, the corporation's statistical data seem to suggest that during
the crisis there has been an increase rather than a decrease in the various
forms of informal resistance, such as late arrival at work, absenteeism,
malingering and poor work performance. The proportion of total person-
12 See footnote 5 above
days lost due to uncompleted work rose from 7.22 per cent in 1987/88 to
8.24 per cent in 1989/90, while those lost due to unauthorized absence rose
from 5.27 per cent in 1987/88 to 5.71 per cent in 1989/90.13 Although this
increase might appear small, it is nevertheless significant if one takes into
account the intensification of managerial efforts to increase labour discipline
during the economie crisis. The rate of absenteeism at the Tole Tea Estate
has certainly caused concern: the estate manager reported to the union that
absenteeism was responsible for the loss of over 1700 person-days during the
months July-August 1992. He estimated the corporation's financial loss at
about FCFA 11 m. He warned the union president that hè would not
hesitate to dismiss more than a hundred workers if the union and the shop
stewards failed to address this Situation.14 Apparently, the managerial
crusade against 'undisciplined and unproductive' workers has not been
successful during the crisis.
Managerial Efforts to Strengthen Control over the Labour Process
Supervisory staff constitute an essential link between the estate management
and the workers in the labour process. They are expected to communicate
the orders of estate management to the workers and to maintain discipline in
the labour process.
Like other CDC workers, pluckers have always drawn a clear line
between 'bad' and 'nice' supervisors. Bad supervisors are those who tend to
treat the workers as objects of production and are largely insensitive to the
workers' plight. They may be differentiated into two types (see Adesina,
1989): supervisors who are notoriously authoritarian and bossy, who
command their subordinates without taking into account their opinions and
advice; and those who are over-zealous in the exercise of their duties and
interested only in increasing output, tending to supervise their subordinates
closely and uncompassionately. Nice supervisors, by contrast, are those who
treat their subordinates as human beings in the labour process and take their
personal and domestic problems into consideration in the exercise of their
supervisory powers. They are usually less strict, leaving the workers a
certain measure of autonomy in the execution of their allotted task.
Since the beginning of the economie crisis there have been enormous
pressures from the management on the supervisory staff to exercise tight
control over their subordinates, to use their authority to the füll and, if
13. See CDC Annual Repons and Accounts, 1987-90, Yaoundé: SOPECAM.
14 See letter from Mr R. M Achin, Estate Manager Tole Tea, to President Agricultural
Workers' Union, dated 16 September 1992, in file MTPS/IDTPS/SWP/LB.2/vol. XXVII,
Complamts from CDC (Buea' archives of Provincial Delegation of Labour and Social
Welfare)
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necessary, to discipline any worker without compassion. This increasingly
authoritarian and over-zealous supervision seems not to have had the
desired effect of strengthening managerial control over the labour process. It
seems rather to have provoked the workers, making them feel like slaves,
constantly pushed to increase production for no reward. Although there
used to be numerous collective actions aimed at the transfer or dismissal of
authoritarian and over-zealous supervisors, such actions abated during the
economie crisis. The workers seem to have realized that not only are these
actions risky, but they will almost certainly be ineffective; with the
management actively encouraging strict supervisors during the crisis, it is
not likely to give in to collective demands from the workers for their
removal.
However, there still seems to be widespread informal resistance against
mtensified managerial control over the labour process, which manifests itself
in various forms including:
• Insubordination: it is not uncommon for workers to simply refuse to
carry out orders from their supervisors, even if such a refusal might
result in a considerable loss of output. For instance, some Ndu pluckers
refuse to work during the heavy downpours in the cold, rainy season at
Ndu. Others refuse to do overtime on Saturdays during the peak
plucking season, as they look upon Saturday afternoons as a period for
resting, visiting friends and relatives, or working on their own coffee
farms. Estate records suggest that insubordination is increasingly
accompanied by insults and abuse and even physical attacks on
supervisory staff.
• Attempts to discredit supervisory staff: at times, the pluckers try to play
tricks upon the supervisors and to discredit them with their superiors.
This often takes the form of falsely accusing them of bribery, corrup-
tion and other misdeeds, in the hope that management will take action
against them.
• The threat of using mystical powers: pluckers sometimes threaten to
härm or kill a supervisor by means of sorcery and witchcraft. It is
difficult to know whether this is mere bluff or a real threat.
Managerial Efforts to Minimize Wages and Other Conditions of Service
The workers have always fought for an improvement in their living
Standards and have steadfastly resisted any managerial effort to curtail their
wages and fringe benefits. It is small wonder that they were furious about
the 6 January 1990 agreement between the management and the unions
introducing a compulsory savings scheme and a drastic reduction in their
fringe benefits. Their bitterness was reflected in a number of collective
actions.
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Straight after the signing of the agreement, the newly elected DUAW
president, Mr G. N. Majam, was accused by the shop stewards of betrayal
of workers' interests. The shop stewards subsequently refused to commun-
icate the terms of the agreement to the workers. When Mr Majam himself
tried to explain the agreement, he barely escaped a severe beating from the
angry workers. Following Mr Majam's dismal failure to persuade the
workers to accept the agreement, the CDC General Manager decided to go
to Ndu personally. In a mass meeting, hè threatened the workers that non-
acceptance of the agreement would inevitably lead to the closure of the
estate because of the corporation's precarious fmancial position. This left
them with no other choice but to comply.
A year later, on 4 January 1991, the Ndu workers went on strike without
informing the shop stewards and the union leadership. Faced with serious
fmancial problems after the drastic cut in their incomes, they were angry
that their family allowances had not been paid for eighteen months and that
they, unlike other CDC workers, had not received any Christmas advances.
Attempts by the Labour Department and the union to settle the strike failed.
It was only after the payment of family allowances on 9 January 1991 that
work was resumed.
In early 1992, all the CDC workers in the Fako Division, including the
Tole female pluckers, started to agitate for the abrogation of the 6 January
1990 agreement and the immediate payment of seven quarters' family
allowance arrears. Their demands were supported by the FAWU president,
Mr Vewessee. The workers went on strike on 21 May 1992 and refused to
negotiate with the management until Mr Vewessee returned from the CTUC
Conference he was attending in Yaoundé. On his return on 26 May, they
called off the strike and authorized him to negotiate with the management.
These negotiations eventually resulted in the amendment of the 6 January
1990 agreement described above.
Besides these sporadic collective actions, workers have engaged in a
variety of informal actions to protest against the reduction of their incomes,
including output restriction, sabotage and involvement in 'illegal' income-
generating activities. Some pluckers do not keep to the plucking Standards:
they mix bad leaves with good ones, a practice which enables them to
complete their task earlier and to achieve more weight and income. Others
cut the tea bushes and prunings and use them for firewood, while others
steal tea from the factory and seil it to middlemen. The management
frequently complains that the theft of tea has reached unprecedented levels
since the economie crisis and has caused serious losses to the Company. The
increase of theft is probably closely connected with the workers'
interpretation of this criminal offence. It would appear that they regard
theft and other such 'illegal' activities as opportunities for taking what is due
to them in return for their hard labour, and for reducing the level of their
exploitation (Gordon, 1977).
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This study of Cameroonian plantation workers presents a more complex
picture of labour responses to the economie crisis and SAP than the case
studies of Nigerian industrial workers which are available. The CDC tea
pluckers seem to employ a variety of strategies to cope with the managerial
adjustment measures. A growing number of pluckers are adopting an
individual survival orientation rather than an oppositional posture. They do
their utmost to make a good impression upon the management through
hard work and disciplined behaviour, in the hope that this strategy will help
them escape from the regulär managerial retrenchment exercises. Some
workers still rely on the bargaining strength of the state-controlled unions
for the protection of their interests. Many workers, however, tend to by-pass
the unions and to lodge their individual and collective complaints with the
Labour Department which is still perceived by most workers as a neutral
intermediary between management and labour. Unexpectedly, the majority
of workers have continued to resort to (sporadic) collective actions and
(frequent) informal actions to protest against their intensified exploitation
and Subordination in the labour process.
A number of factors together seem to account for the continuing
resistance of most CDC workers. One of these is their remarkable degree of
solidarity. The various internal divisions among the workers never seem to
have impeded them from regularly resorting to common actions against the
employer, although it cannot be denied that their solidarity has been
weakened somewhat by the present economie crisis. This solidarity has been
promoted by their residence in 'occupational communities' where they share
similar living and working conditions, speak one lingua franco (Pidgin
English), and can easily communicate with each other (cf. Ardener et al.,
1960; DeLancey, 1973). A second factor is the workers' persistent belief in
the efficacy of militant action. The illiterate and poorly educated estate
workers have always tended to put less faith in the institutionalized
bargaining procedures than the relatively moderate union leadership, mainly
composed of clerks and supervisory staff. The regulär failure of these
procedures to achieve the workers' aims, together with the establishment of
state control over the unions, has strengthened this belief in militant action
as the only way to bring management to its knees and to redress long-
standing grievances.
The growing demotivation of many of the workers during the crisis has
also played a role. Far from their increased productivity being compensated
by increased wages, the workers' real incomes have been seriously eroded.
Most workers, and women in particular, are still reluctant to resign and lose
their regulär monthly wage income, however meagre; but a growing number
of workers, mostly among the men, are no longer interested in keeping their
job at any cost, especially as they have lost confidence in the corporation's
eventual economie recovery. Some of these workers have already resigned,
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having collected their long-service awards and gratuities as well as voluntary
and compulsory savings. This capital is used for investment in farming,
trading, and other potentially lucrative activities. Others are contemplating
resignation. No longer committed to their jobs, these workers tend to
become either more militant and less reluctant to show resistance, or more
apathetic, having worked out alternatives.
Another factor influencing the workers' attitude is their daily exposure to
the glaring socio-economic inequalities on the estates. Although the
corporation's adjustment measures have effected a substantial reduction in
the high salaries and numerous fringe benefits of the managerial staff, there
remains a wide gap in incomes and living Standards between them and the
workers. There is no doubt that workers' acute feelings of exploitation and
Subordination are reinforced by the sharp contrast between their own misery
and managerial opulence. Finally, I found that the CDC workers' continu-
ing resistance has also been influenced by their perceptions of the state. In
his comparative work, Burawoy (1985) has used the concepts of 'productive
politics' and 'global politics' to tackle the complex relationship between the
labour process and the state. Like most Cameroonians, the CDC workers
tend to attribute the economie crisis primarily to the corruption and
mismanagement of the ruling regime rather than to the sharp fall in com-
modity prices. The majority of them belong to one of the Opposition parties,
mostly the populist Social Democratie Front (SDF). They are unwilling to
make sacrifices voluntarily for 'economie recovery' as long as the regime
which is in power lacks legitimacy and appears to be interested only in the
'politics of the belly' (Bayart, 1989).
The management has failed dismally to fully control workers' resistance
during the crisis. There is no reason to believe that it will succeed in the near
future. On the contrary, there are indications that labour resistance may
even increase. The unions have largely regained their former autonomy and
the union leadership has become more critical of the adjustment measures
which it had previously agreed upon with the management. CDC workers
have always admired militant union leadership and are inclined to support
any union actions in defence of their interests.
One final observation: I did not find any evidence for the widespread
assumption that female workers in the Third World are more amenable to
control than male workers. There was a slight difference in the degree and
modes of resistance between Ndu male pluckers and Tole female pluckers:
Ndu male pluckers tend to be somewhat more militant because they enjoy
an easier 'exit-option', due to their continuing close links with their local
community. On the other hand, Tole female pluckers have shown them-
selves to be more inclined to circumvent the state-controlled unions and to
engage in alternative modes of resistance because of the patriarchal
structure of the unions, and women's multiple productive and reproductive
responsibilities outside the labour process.
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